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Abstract— Spectrum sharing mechanisms have evolved to meet 
different needs related to increasing spectrum use efficiency. At 
first, decentralized and opportunistic cognitive radios (and 
cognitive radio networks) were the primary focus of research for 
these mechanisms. This gradually transitioned towards the 
development of cooperative sharing methods based on databases, 
typified by TV White Spaces databases. Spectrum sharing is now 
the basis for the dynamic and fine-grained spectrum rights regime 
for the Citizen’s Band Radio Service (CBRS) as well as for License 
Shared Access (LSA). 
The emergence of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin has stimulated 
interest in applying its underlying technology, blockchain, to other 
applications as well, such as securities trading and supply chain 
management.  This paper explores the application of blockchain to 
radio spectrum management.  While blockchains could underlie 
radio spectrum management more broadly, we will focus on 
dynamic spectrum sharing applications.  Like the cooperative 
approaches currently in use, blockchain is a database technology. 
However, a blockchain is a decentralized database in which the 
owner of the data maintains control. We consider the benefits and 
limitations of blockchain solutions in general, and then examine 
their potential application to four major categories of spectrum 
sharing. 
 
Index Terms—Blockchain, Radio Spectrum Management, 
Radio Spectrum Sharing 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
LOCKCHAIN has been heralded as a technology that could 
be as important as the Internet [2].  Secure distributed 
ledgers and cryptocurrencies based on blockchain technologies 
could have many applications and be broadly disruptive. This 
paper examines one potential use case, exploring the ways this 
technology might be applied to spectrum sharing.1   
This paper is structured as follows. Section II provides an 
introduction to the concepts of distributed ledgers based on 
blockchain technology. Section III provides a general 
description of how distributed ledgers could impact spectrum 
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sharing. Section IV describes how distributed ledgers for 
spectrum management could be implemented in different 
spectrum access scenarios, and discusses the pros and cons of 
using blockchain in each scenario. Section V discusses the 
implications for various stakeholder groups of blockchain-
based distributed ledgers in spectrum management. Section VI 
presents our conclusions and recommendations for future work. 
An appendix is provided as a brief primer to blockchain 
technology concepts. 
II. DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY 
Technically, blockchain technology implements a distributed 
ledger: a secure decentralized form of a database where no 
single party has control [36]. It offers a secure, resilient, 
reliable, transparent and decentralized way of validating, 
recording and manipulating data across all the nodes of a 
network of interested parties that want to keep the distributed 
ledger up to date. Blockchain is best known as the basis of 
Bitcoin, a private digital “cryptocurrency” that can function as 
money despite not being issued by any government [23]. 
However, distributed ledgers have many more uses. There are 
now other services operating on the Bitcoin blockchain, 
independent blockchains with their own cryptocurrencies (such 
as Ethereum and XRP), and distributed ledgers with no native 
currency.  
The transactions stored on a distributed ledger could 
represent anything: holdings of a digital currency (as with 
Bitcoin), the movement of goods across a global supply chain, 
syndicated loans among financial institutions, or land title 
records, to name just a few applications under development. 
Just as relational databases accessed through client-server 
computing were the foundation for the business revolution built 
around the World Wide Web, blockchain, as a distributed 
ledger, is a foundational technology that could have far-
reaching impacts [17]. 
The distinctive feature of blockchain distributed ledgers is 
that each node connected to the blockchain network can 
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1 While in this paper we focus on blockchain as it applies to 
spectrum sharing, there may be situations where blockchain 
could be applied to non-sharing-based approaches, such as its 
use in spectrum license databases or possibly as part of a 
spectrum usage application.  
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maintain its own copy of the distributed ledger and control over 
its own data, yet everyone sees the same ledger. Further, since 
the entries in the ledger have been validated as they are entered, 
there is no need for a master copy or clearinghouse. This 
property, known as consensus, may be achieved through several 
technical mechanisms, which are discussed in more detail in the  
Appendix. The advantages of a consensus-based system depend 
on the particular application, but they may include: resistance 
to censorship or tampering, avoidance of the need to trust a 
central government or private institution, elimination of 
inefficiencies and errors in reconciling transactions across a 
network, and an immutable transaction record.  
Once information is stored on a blockchain, it can be acted 
upon through “smart contracts” [8]. Smart contracts are special-
purpose code that can execute instructions on a blockchain [36]. 
They can execute contractual logic, such as paying beneficiaries 
according to the terms of a will, or granting rights to start a car 
if the lease is paid up. Bitcoin uses a very simple set of smart 
contract functions limited for security reasons to moving 
currency tokens between accounts. Other systems go farther. 
Smart contracts mean that virtually any activity that can be 
represented in software could, in theory, be implemented in an 
automated and distributed form on a blockchain. This idea was 
proposed by Szabo in the 1990s [32], but was not well-known 
until the emergence of cryptocurrencies [7].   
There are two primary types of distributed ledger networks: 
public and permissioned [31]. Which approach is best depends 
on the application scenario.  In public (permissionless) 
blockchain systems such as Bitcoin, anyone can join the 
network, so all nodes are treated as potential attackers. 
Producing a reliable consensus involves significant 
performance overhead. Permissioned blockchains limit 
participation to identified users.  
Table 1 summarizes key characteristics of blockchain-based 
distributed ledgers. 
Benefit Description 
Decentra- 
lization 
No trusted party or intermediary is needed to 
validate transactions. Users control their own 
data. 
Transpa- 
rency 
The history of transactions and the software 
algorithms governing the blockchain network 
are typically public for anyone to review. 
Immuta- 
bility 
It is extremely difficult to change data 
recorded on a blockchain. 
Availa- 
bility 
Blockchain ledgers are replicated among 
many nodes, making them highly available 
even if some nodes become inaccessible. 
Security All entries in the ledger are cryptographically 
secured. All transactions are digitally signed, 
and access is through public/private 
cryptographic key pairs. 
Table 1- Key Characteristics of Blockchains 
III. BLOCKCHAINS FOR SPECTRUM SHARING 
As a general-purpose database-type technology, blockchain 
can in theory be applied to virtually any business context. 
However, the potential benefits of distributed ledgers come 
with costs. Blockchain technology is not the best solution for 
every scenario. The first step in assessing the usefulness of 
blockchain is to ask whether its features — decentralization, 
transparency, immutability, availability, and security — are 
relevant for the application at hand. The World Economic 
Forum suggests a similar approach [39]. If all relevant data are 
to remain under the control of a single trusted party, for 
example, there is no need for a decentralized solution.  The FCC 
table of spectrum frequency allocations [12] published on a 
blockchain would be no better than the document published in 
the Federal Register. 
From this high-level perspective, spectrum sharing seems 
like a promising candidate for blockchain technology, as shown 
in Table 2.  
Benefit Potential Application to 
Spectrum Sharing 
Decentra- 
lization 
Eliminate the need for trusted third parties 
such as spectrum licensees, band managers, 
and database/SAS administrators.  
Transpa- 
rency 
Better localized visibility into spectrum 
usage; auditability of activity for effective 
implementation of spectrum sharing rules.  
Immuta- 
bility 
Permanent records prevent tampering, 
facilitate accurate auditing/enforcement, and 
can ensure accurate implementation of rules. 
Availa-
bility 
More reliable accessibility of spectrum 
sharing databases. 
Security As communications infrastructure, wireless 
systems need strong security against attacks. 
Secure ledgers also foster reliable 
enforcement of sharing regimes. 
Table 2 - Blockchain characteristics applied to spectrum sharing 
In contrast with traditional exclusive frequency allocations, 
spectrum sharing by definition involves multiple entities with 
rights to use the spectrum. Management mechanisms using 
databases are being employed for spectrum sharing regimes 
such as TV White spaces (TVWS) and the Citizens Band Radio 
Service (CBRS). Since blockchains are a form of database, it is 
worth exploring whether they could be used to enhance the 
effectiveness of various forms of spectrum sharing.   
Information about access rights and usage can be recorded on 
a distributed ledger, and managed using smart contracts.  
Distributed ledgers offer benefits compared to centralized 
databases for tracking property rights and assets which could 
make them effective tools for spectrum management. Some of 
the benefits we foresee are: 
• Increased speed in the evaluation of available spectrum 
resources (in a given area) and registering spectrum use 
without incurring the processing delay of an authorization 
from a regulator. Service operators participating in a 
blockchain for spectrum management interactions (e.g., 
sharing and trading) could check their own local copy of 
the distributed ledger to decide what spectrum resources to 
use. 
• Regulators can use the information in the distributed ledger 
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for evaluating spectrum access efficiency, computing fees 
for spectrum use, and enforcing spectrum access regimes.  
• With the use of smart contracts, dynamic and rule-based 
spectrum use interactions can be tracked and enabled such 
as: changing the fees for the use of spectrum based on time 
of day, automatic transfer and reconciliation of spectrum 
use fees, facilitation of spectrum trading interactions 
between service providers.  
We have not been able to identify prior work that examines 
the utility of blockchain across the entire spectrum sharing 
landscape. Previous research focuses on specific use cases. 
Yrjölä considers the applicability of blockchain technology 
within the CBRS spectrum sharing environment [42]. He 
identifies eight CBRS functions where a writing to a shared 
database, the absence of trust, disintermediation, or interaction 
and dependence between transactions could make blockchain 
technology useful. He concludes that blockchain “has potential 
to significantly reduce transaction costs in the CBRS through 
automatization of business-to-business complex multi-step 
workflows in contracting, brokering and data exchange.” 
Kotobi and Bilén propose a blockchain protocol for cognitive 
radio networks [41]. They simulate a system in which primary 
spectrum users conduct an auction for opportunistic access, 
secondary users pay for access with a cryptocurrency, and the 
access rights are recorded on a public blockchain. Like bitcoin, 
the cryptocurrency can be earned either by exchanging 
traditional fiat currencies or by contributing processing 
resources to secure the blockchain. They conclude that this 
system outperforms conventional spectrum sharing protocols 
under both moderate and severe fading conditions.  
Similarly, El Gamal and El Gamal show that a 
cryptocurrency can incentivize users to share their resources in 
one channel, in return for credit that allows them to maximize 
their gains in future channel uses [43]. The economic incentive 
allows for the optimal assignment of messages and a 
transmission scheme without a centralized authority. 
Rawat and Alshaikhi propose that a blockchain could be used 
to create virtual wireless networks when spectrum owners 
sublease to mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) [44]. 
The blockchain provides security to the participants, prevents 
spectrum owners from overcommitting their resources, and 
helps MVNOs meet the QoS requirements of their users.  
DiPascale et al propose a smart contract system for providers 
of “small cell as a service” to implement service level 
agreements (SLAs) for mobile network operators in localized 
areas [12]. This use case could in theory be implemented either 
on licensed spectrum or through unlicensed frequencies using a 
mechanism such as LSA to provide quality of service 
guarantees. The authors focus on how the smart contract could 
automate the processes of payment and enforcement of the 
SLA, making it easier for individuals or other small-scale 
antenna operators to implement these arrangements with 
operators.  
In contrast, we offer a generalized analysis of the benefits and 
limitations of blockchain solutions for spectrum sharing. For 
those readers unfamiliar with the basics of blockchain 
technology, a brief overview is provided in the Appendix  
There are two critical questions for any proposed blockchain 
use case: What is the problem to be solved, and why is 
blockchain superior to existing database technologies? As noted 
earlier in this section, the key differentiators of blockchain 
approaches are decentralization, transparency, immutability, 
availability, and security. In the case of spectrum sharing, there 
are a number of functions in which these could address 
limitations of existing regimes. Blockchain approaches promise 
both business and technical benefits. However, a further 
distinction needs to be made between public and permissioned 
blockchains each of which offers different tradeoffs.  
Table 3 is a high-level comparison of blockchain-based 
approaches to the primary spectrum management approaches. 
The comparison is not exact, in that blockchains are 
technologies, not particular licensing regimes. The purpose of 
the table is to highlight the major opportunities and limitations 
of incorporating blockchains into spectrum sharing systems. 
There are several issues that would need to be considered to 
implement blockchain-based spectrum sharing. Mobile devices 
would likely not have the processing power and battery capacity 
to operate as full blockchain nodes, but fixed devices might, 
depending on the consensus protocol used.  
One additional issue is that unless limited to nodes that have 
a wired network connection, the distributed ledger would likely 
also use spectrum resources for the communications needed to 
validate transactions. This could create capacity issues, 
especially if the blockchain uses broadcast communications 
among nodes, as Bitcoin does. High-performance distributed 
permissioned ledgers may have significantly lesser 
communications requirements, because nodes are trusted [31]. 
In addition, the inherent unreliability of wireless 
communication, which is magnified in a primary non-
cooperative sharing environment, will likely require adaptation 
of blockchain protocols in the same way that wireless 
communications devices must incorporate greater error 
correction and buffering than wired ones. The participant 
entities in a permissioned blockchain could in theory ensure that 
there is an adequate set of communication resources at all times 
to ensure the operation of the blockchain. Services that need 
spectrum resources and the reliability to access them would be 
better served in such a permissioned environment. Overhead 
and reliability conditions would be more difficult to satisfy in a 
public blockchain deployment [45, 46]. 
There are a various other practical implementation questions 
that we only address here in a cursory way, such as who would 
operate and govern the blockchain networks, how they would 
be funded, and how they would be deployed. Because the 
effects of wireless transmissions are localized, a blockchain 
would need to have sufficiently dense information to be useful. 
IV. APPLICATION TO CATEGORIES OF SPECTRUM SHARING 
 
There are many ways in which researchers have proposed 
sharing spectrum.  Each approach makes different assumptions 
and may have different functional requirements to support it.  
Even if blockchain technology is useful for spectrum sharing 
generally, its value may depend on matching implementation  
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Table 3- Benefits and Limitations of spectrum sharing mechanisms
details with sharing scenarios. However, we propose that it is 
not necessary, at this point anyway, to consider the functional 
requirements for each spectrum sharing scheme that has been 
proposed and that it is sufficient to consider classes of 
approaches. 
 
 
To this end, we consider the typology for spectrum sharing 
proposed by Weiss and Lehr in [35], reproduced in Table 4 as 
a guide for this discussion. It should be noted that there are 
approaches and technologies that arguably fall between the 
categories listed, so these four categories are best seen as 
archetypical with the possibility that some forms of sharing do 
not neatly fit into any one of these categories.   
The term "primary sharing" in Table 4 means that all users 
have equivalent (or equal) rights to access the spectrum, as is 
the case, for example, in the unlicensed bands.  In contrast, a 
secondary sharing regime implies a hierarchy of rights, where 
incumbents/primary users/license holders have superior rights 
to spectrum entrants/secondary users. TVWS and CBRS as well 
as Licensed Shared Access (LSA) are examples of this kind of 
rights relationship.  Much of the research in spectrum sharing 
assumes a secondary sharing regime.  In the table, 
 Technical Benefits Business Benefits Limitations 
FCC 
exclusive 
licensing  
• Clear boundaries between 
allocations facilitate 
interference mitigation and 
performance guarantees 
• Receivers can be less 
sophisticated, and thus 
potentially less expensive 
• Auctions can be employed 
to give spectrum to those 
who value it most 
• Licensees’ confidence 
about rights supports 
investment and secondary 
markets 
• May fail to maximize spectrum 
utilization, by excluding non-
interfering secondary users 
• Cost of spectrum pushes 
economic model to services vs. 
device-only 
• Potential for licensee spectrum 
hoarding 
Unlicensed • Encourages innovation 
through open standards 
• Device-based model 
incentivizes improvements in 
hardware/software 
• Permissionless entry 
supports experimentation  
• Device purchases can 
replace recurring service 
charges 
• No transmission guarantees  
• Potential for “tragedy of the 
commons” without interference 
protections 
• No differentiation between 
primary and secondary users 
limits applications 
3rd Party 
DB/SAS 
• Allows guarantees for 
primary users and open 
access 
• Mandatory rules provide 
certainty compared to 
unlicensed 
• Added capacity without 
new auctions/clearing 
• Allows heightened 
protection/override for 
government uses 
• Flexibility for market 
participants 
• Database provider controls data 
• Need to convince incumbents of 
value proposition 
• Accuracy of database records 
not guaranteed 
Public         
blockchain 
• Transparent ledger for 
spectrum management and 
auditing 
• Strong security and high 
availability for databases 
• Smart contracts allow for 
complex sharing 
arrangements 
• Decentralization guards 
against any party exerting 
control 
• Users can maintain control 
over data 
• Cryptocurrencies can 
incentivize cost-based 
activities 
• Significant overhead of 
consensus protocols 
• Uncertain governance 
• Anonymity can pose 
enforcement challenges 
Permissioned 
blockchain 
• Transparent ledger for 
spectrum management and 
auditing 
• Can support high throughput 
• Strong security and high 
availability for databases 
• Smart contracts allow for 
complex sharing 
arrangements 
• No central database 
operator that can exercise 
control 
• Users can maintain control 
over data 
 
• Questionable benefits relative to 
traditional databases 
• Governance still an issue among 
competitors 
 
 Non- 
Cooperative 
Cooperative 
Primary Unlicensed Secondary Markets 
Secondary Opportunistic Cooperative Sharing 
Table 4- Modes of spectrum sharing 
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“cooperative” sharing means that ex ante agreements have been 
struck between the sharing parties regarding sharing.  
Secondary markets that involve voluntary exchange can be 
thought of as cooperative sharing as well.  Finally, in non-
cooperative sharing, users do not coordinate their use ex ante.   
It is important to keep context in mind when applying a 
simple framework such as the one in Table 4.  For example, 
while TVWS can be seen as a form of cooperative secondary 
sharing when the relationship between the class of secondary 
users and the class of primary users is considered, sharing 
among secondary users may be non-cooperative.  Similarly, 
sharing between primary users in this case is cooperative 
(through the licensing process) and primary.   
In the following subsections, we use this framework to 
explore if and how blockchain technology might be applied for 
spectrum sharing. We discuss each mode of spectrum sharing 
in an order that roughly conveys the feasibility of using BC in 
each mode based on our analysis.  We end each subsection with 
a table that summarizes the benefits and drawbacks of using a 
blockchain for each spectrum sharing mode. 
 
A. Primary Cooperative Sharing 
In primary, cooperative sharing, users coordinate their uses 
ex ante. The best example of this might be the (as yet 
hypothetical) real time spectrum markets, as studied by [7] [33]. 
The functions that this kind of sharing implies are: 
● Spectrum users need to be able to find transmission 
opportunities that map to their needs 
● Spectrum users need to be able to exchange usage rights 
rapidly 
A blockchain could be used to keep a dynamic record of the 
users operating in the band, which in turn can be used to identify 
stations to communicate with or to supplement sensing of the 
local environment. In a rapidly changing communications 
environment, spectrum use will change as mobile devices alter 
their location and fixed devices go in and out of service. Each 
spectrum user will only need to know about its local 
environment at any given moment to determine the availability 
of spectrum resources. All spectrum use data recorded on a 
blockchain can be time-stamped and geocoded, either by the 
device itself or the node in the blockchain network that first 
recorded the information. Having each device register its 
location on the blockchain would generate significant overhead. 
Aside from using a blockchain for determining spectrum 
environment status, the primary function of a distributed ledger 
in an environment of real-time spectrum markets would be to 
record and enforce market transactions, since in cooperative 
spectrum sharing uses of spectrum are coordinated and rights 
are allocated before transmission occurs.  
A ledger for primary cooperative sharing must therefore be 
able to record transactions for transmission rights where 
additional logic could use the records in enforcing those rights 
among devices. Spectrum access coordination and maintenance 
of the ledger could be performed by a modified SAS or a band 
manager [7]. The band manager would read requests for 
spectrum entered on the blockchain by the nodes from entities 
that want to operate in a given location. The requests would 
specify the spectrum requirements of the node (i.e. bandwidth, 
central frequency, location, time, etc.). The band manager 
would proceed to determine if the request could be satisfied and 
record a spectrum assignment in the blockchain that the 
requesting node could afterwards read and enable. Assuming 
that there is only one band manager that can decide on spectrum 
assignments, the benefits of a blockchain here would be very 
limited when compared to a database approach. In 
environments where multiple entities are making assignment 
decisions on the same band and geographical area (such as the 
case of multiple SAS in CBRS), then a blockchain could be 
used to coordinate the assignment decisions of each of the band 
managers/SAS and even allow regulators to monitor spectrum 
use without affecting other band manager/SAS related 
processes. In an even more decentralized design, the logic of 
the band manager/SAS system could be implemented as a smart 
contract on a blockchain. 
For a real time spectrum trading market operation such as 
that described in [7] a blockchain would decentralize the 
operations of a spectrum exchange that records requests and 
offers of spectrum and performs the exchange of transmission 
rights.  In this scenario, through the blockchain the requests and 
offers of spectrum can be recorded, and with the use of smart 
contracts the exchange of transmission rights is carried out. 
These could enable a broad variety of spectrum sharing 
relationships.  One such contract might be a time limited 
spectrum use trade (e.g., a lease); when the contract terminates 
or the rights-holder negotiates a new agreement, the blockchain 
can be used to enforce the new allocation of transmission 
authorizations. A different smart contract might involve a 
spectrum rights-holder granting another user transmission 
rights limited by time, geography, transmission characteristics, 
or throughput. Transactions could be contingent on verification 
of payment, or verification that devices are compliant with 
transmission protocols, etc.  
Smart contracts on spectrum management blockchains will 
require access to external information to execute the logic of the 
contract in many instances.  Smart contracts can reference 
information outside the blockchain in two ways. They can 
incorporate oracles, which are automated systems that verify 
information (such as a stock price on a given date) [4], or they 
can incorporate human arbitrators. Most blockchain-based 
systems, including Bitcoin, support a feature called multisig, in 
which the approval of transactions require the submission of M 
out of N cryptographically signed approval messages (most 
commonly 2 out of 3) [24]. If each party to a transaction has 
one signature key and a neutral arbitrator has the third, the 
arbitrator's decision can bind the parties and activate the 
enforcement mechanism of the smart contract. A smart contract 
for primary cooperative spectrum sharing might, for example, 
require a user to submit to verification that its devices meet 
certain criteria by a third-party firm, which would control the 
private signing key needed to enforce the smart contract.  
In addition to the flexibility and automation of smart 
contracts, blockchains for primary cooperative sharing could 
also provide a transparent, auditable, unified record of 
transactions. This provides the same benefits in the spectrum 
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sharing context as blockchains in other industries. For example, 
having a single shared ledger means that each spectrum user 
doesn't have to maintain its own database, verify that its records 
accord with its counterparties, and/or trust the accuracy of a 
central clearinghouse (e.g., a SAS or a TVWS database). That 
no government or a monopoly private contractor would be 
needed to operate the transaction clearinghouse could address 
concerns about biases and excessive charges that have arisen in 
analogous contexts such as telephone numbering administration 
and internet domain name registration.  With blockchain, each 
party controls its own data, but everyone is able to see the entire 
ledger. Assuming the ledger is transparent, market participants 
and regulators can perform audits and observe market trends. 
Regulators could also use the blockchain to tax transactions as 
a funding mechanism. If transactions are considered 
competitively strategic, a permissioned ledger could be made 
non-transparent, or could only be viewed by the regulator. 
Blockchains for the primary cooperative sharing category 
that are only recording explicit transactions between spectrum 
rightsholders, rather than tracking the activity of every device 
would require less transaction throughput. In a real-time 
spectrum marketplace, the volume of transactions would not be 
trivial, and the system would still have to update its state 
quickly enough for devices to receive accurate information. 
However, blockchain operations introduce latency in 
registering transactions, in particular because of block latency 
which is incurred by nodes in the blockchain having to wait for 
enough requests and/or assignment transactions to have been 
issued before a block can be built and deemed a candidate to be 
incorporated in the blockchain and submitted to the consensus 
algorithm used in a particular blockchain implementation. 
Thus, only near-real time operations can be enabled, but if the 
block size to speed tradeoff is carefully balanced, a spectrum 
marketplace using a blockchain could be feasible, although 
research is still needed to be certain.  
As an illustrative example of a blockchain scenario for 
primary cooperative sharing, the top part of the figure 1 shows 
a scenario where within a given service area there are four 
wireless service providers which have agreed to participate in a 
permissioned blockchain. Different spectrum dependent 
devices are located within the service area, each of which is 
managed by one of service providers. The service providers will 
use a distributed ledger based on blockchain to communicate 
and record spectrum trading activity within the service area and 
streamline settlement and transfer processes of such trading. 
Part (c) of figure 1 is a simplified example of the structure of 
the data blocks that constitute the blockchain for this scenario. 
Each block could be as simple as a single spectrum sell or buy 
offer or even the data of a completed spectrum trade. Each block 
would have a cryptographic hash value associated with it. The 
value of the hash protects the information in the block from 
being changed including the hash value of the previous block 
which was included in the current block to form another link in 
the blockchain (effectively chaining the blocks). 
B. Secondary Cooperative Sharing 
In secondary cooperative sharing, users coordinate their use ex 
ante. Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) behave in 
this way, but so do users under the LSA regime or the CBRS 
recently approved by the FCC. Also, this mode of sharing might 
also be useful to describe users of a commercial mobile service, 
where the usage is controlled through the access system (e.g., 
HSPA, LTE). 
 
 
Figure 1- (a) Four different wireless service operators on a 
permissioned blockchain. (b) Service area with several spectrum 
dependent devices belonging to each of the different operators. (c) 
Samples of blocks that form part of the blockchain for this scenario 
Blockchain use in Primary Cooperative Sharing 
Benefits (+) and drawbacks (-) 
(+) Enables spectrum trading markets 
(+) Enables different types of spectrum trading transactions 
with the use of smart contracts 
(+) Provides an auditable, unified record of transactions 
(-) True real-time spectrum market is not feasible due to 
latency in the blockchain. A near-real-time market could be 
feasible but needs to be carefully designed. 
Blockchain type to use 
Public or permissioned blockchain could be used. However, 
a permissioned blockchain would be simpler to manage, faster, 
and can better protect transaction information that could be 
used for competitive purposes. The regulator would need to 
have access to the blockchain to guarantee fair market 
operation.  
Table 5 - Benefits and drawbacks of blockchains for primary 
cooperative sharing 
For TVWS and the 3.5 GHz SAS, databases essentially 
memorialize a fixed set of rights: two-tier secondary sharing 
rules for the case of TVWS, and three-tier SAS based 
operations for 3.5 GHz. Secondary or lower tier users must 
query the database to avoid interfering with the primary users, 
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thus protecting their rights. Secondary cooperative sharing is 
likely a rich domain for blockchain implementation. Most of the 
discussion in the previous section about blockchains and smart 
contracts for primary cooperative sharing would also apply to 
the secondary model. The major difference is the greater variety 
of transactions possible in a secondary cooperative sharing 
environment. Rights-holders are not simply transacting to give 
all-or-nothing primary rights to other parties. They can 
subdivide their rights under any arrangements they choose.  
The issue of who operates the blockchain may also have a 
different resolution in this category. There need not be one 
blockchain for the entire band. An incumbent, for example, 
might operate a private blockchain to manage its MVNOs or its 
implementation of LSA. The blockchain could coordinate 
among secondary users subsidiary to that incumbent, but 
wouldn't necessarily affect others.  
There are a few applications in particular to consider in this 
spectrum sharing category: 
● Registration/authorization of devices: Base stations of a 
radio access network (RAN) provider that dynamically 
allow devices associated with previously authorized 
entities to use the base station resources. It is possible to 
imagine this association to occur via a smart contract, 
which would result in a blockchain implementation. Figure 
2 shows an example where a RAN provider automates and 
secures the registration of devices to its infrastructure via a 
smart contract. The logic of the contract and its operation 
on a blockchain can ensure that a transaction registry and 
transfer of fees is secure and auditable. 
● Spectrum Access Systems (SASs) can be seen as an 
approach to the governance of shared spectrum [34]. 
WinnForum has identified some information sharing 
principles that apply particularly to sharing information 
between SASs. It is possible that blockchain based systems 
can support these design goals naturally. Especially those 
related to CBSD registration data captured by a SAS and 
that must be shared with regulators and other SAS entities.  
In the particular case of blockchain supported SAS 
operations, a distributed ledger would be useful in SAS to SAS 
interactions that aim at maintaining a unified view of the 
devices registered for CBRS operation in a particular region (or 
set of regions) where two or more SASs may be offering 
spectrum access services [42]. Similarly, the interactions 
between the operators of ESC (Environmental Sensing 
Capability) devices and SAS operators could be secured and 
managed in a blockchain based distributed ledger.  Further, 
information in the ledger could be useful in conducting forensic 
analysis related to interference complaints.  
C. Secondary Non-Cooperative Sharing 
Secondary, non-cooperative sharing is the opportunistic 
sharing case typified by cognitive radios [15], where secondary 
users do not coordinate their usage in advance with primary 
users.  This approach has been widely studied.  Functions 
implied by this kind of sharing include: 
● Determination of where transmission is possible 
(spectrum hole detection) 
● Determination of other opportunistic users who are using 
the same band 
● Detection of when transmission is no longer possible 
There have been proposals, such as the Cognitive Pilot Channel 
(CPC) [29], that enable a degree of cooperation between the 
incumbent (primary user) and the entrant (secondary user). A 
blockchain could be used as a secure implementation of this 
channel, providing a history of incumbent interventions to the 
community. Basically, the CPC (or similar facility) would 
provide information to radio terminals so that they can decide 
how to (opportunistically) use spectrum. The information could 
include a list of available frequency bands and which primary 
operators are active at a given time and space. This history is  
 
 
 
Figure 2- Registration of devices and RAN provider operations 
supported via smart contracts 
Blockchain use in Secondary Cooperative Sharing 
Benefits (+) and drawbacks (-) 
(+) Enables secure, distributed handling of spectrum usage 
rights 
(+) Enables different types of secondary spectrum use 
transactions with the use of smart contracts 
(+) Provides an auditable, unified record of transactions 
(-) Latency in blockchain operation would limit the rate at 
which new spectrum use transactions can be validated 
Blockchain type to use 
Public or permissioned blockchain could be used. However, a 
permissioned blockchain would be simpler to manage, faster, 
and can better protect transaction information that could be 
used for competitive purposes. The regulator would need to 
have access to the blockchain to guarantee fair market 
operation and efficient use of spectrum resources.  
Table 6 - Benefits and drawbacks of blockchains for secondary 
cooperative spectrum sharing 
useful for entrants to determine their risk [9].  TVWS could also 
be seen as a kind of hybrid, since coordination with the primary 
is cooperative while sharing available channels is opportunistic. 
A promising use of blockchains for secondary non-
cooperative sharing would likely be to enhance the ability of 
opportunistic devices to identify transmission opportunities, 
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and to automate the process of auditing and enforcement for 
those opportunistic users as depicted in Figure 3. As with 
primary non-cooperative sharing, even if unlicensed devices are 
not required to follow a particular protocol, they would benefit 
from richer information about primary users. The 
decentralization, availability, and security of blockchain 
distributed ledgers could be an improvement over the 
centralized databases in existing systems such as TVWS.  
The ultimate question here is whether an opportunistic/non-
cooperative environment lends itself to the use of some 
feature(s) of blockchain.  Does non-cooperation mean not using 
blockchain services?  We see that from a binary (yes/no) 
perspective it might seem that a non-cooperating device would 
not use blockchain services, but there is no need to assume such 
strict behavior categorization and it is likely that there are many 
shades of gray to consider in terms of cooperative and non-
cooperative device operation. For example, a feasible sharing 
model is one in which “non-cooperative” devices participate in 
a blockchain for spectrum sharing to acquire environmental 
input, or possibly simply participate because the spectrum 
policy mandates participation for reasons of producing a log of 
activities for any potential enforcement review that might arise. 
Smart contracts could further enhance such a system. They 
could be used to implement geo-specific transmission masks to 
limit the ability of secondary devices to interfere with primary 
users, while leaving them the flexibility to transmit when, 
where, and how they choose. If primary users experience 
interference, a blockchain-based ledger recording the activities 
of secondary devices could be used to assess violations, or even 
impose penalties through smart contracts. 
  
 
Figure 3- Example of registration of spectrum use in a secondary non-
cooperative environment using Blockchain. 
One of the challenges with the current TVWS system is that 
some primary users provide inaccurate information that 
artificially reduces the scope for secondary users [25]. While a 
blockchain verifies consistency of information on a distributed 
basis, it does not necessarily solve this problem. The blockchain 
itself has no way to determine if the information provided by 
authorized users is truthful. Once information is added to the 
blockchain, it cannot easily be tampered with, but garbage in is 
still garbage out.  
Additional verification and identity/reputation layers could 
theoretically be built on top of the ledger to deal with this "fake 
news” problem. There is widespread experimentation with 
token-curated registries [15] and other mechanisms that employ 
the economic incentive structures of cryptocurrencies and the 
immutable recording of blockchains to improve information 
quality.  In essence, these approaches make it profitable to be 
truthful and unprofitable to be untruthful, so long as a majority 
of users are honest. Further study is required to evaluate 
whether such solutions might be useful for spectrum access 
ledgers. 
 
Blockchain use in Secondary Non-cooperative Sharing 
Benefits (+) and drawbacks (-) 
(+) Provides a record of primary user operations against 
which opportunistic access operations can be executed  
(+) Provides a way to allow direct interaction between users 
at a local level (for such tasks as interference coordination), 
which could remove a centralize bottleneck 
(-) Additional overhead and little differentiation with non-
Cooperative access approaches for secondary users such as 
those used for TVWS. 
Blockchain type to use 
Public or permissioned blockchain could be used. As 
discussed above, there are questions as to what defines a non-
cooperative device and how this device might interact with 
blockchain services.   
Table 7- Benefits and drawbacks of blockchains for secondary non-
cooperative spectrum sharing 
D. Primary Non-Cooperative Sharing 
In this kind of sharing, users do not coordinate their usage of 
the spectrum in advance and they have equal (or equivalent) 
rights to transmit and receive. The most straightforward 
example of this type of sharing would be the open access 
spectrum sharing as typified by the unlicensed ISM bands (even 
though some uses of these bands implement some cooperation 
in their medium access protocols).  There are two sub-
categories of primary non-cooperative sharing: 
1. Open Access Commons: In open access commons, any 
spectrum user that meets the technical requirements of the band 
may operate. No user is guaranteed any additional protection 
against interference. In such an environment, spectrum users 
must be able to find stations to communicate with (whether base 
stations or other mobile users in an ad hoc network); and they 
need to be able to detect and deal with other stations who are 
transmitting and who may or may not be “polite.”  This is, in 
part, what MAC protocols do.  
2. Private Commons: In a private commons, access may be 
governed, meaning that an additional function will be 
determining who gets to use the spectrum and when (as 
suggested in [34]).  For private commons, additional functions 
come into play: 
● Spectrum users must have a way of managing the 
commons and allowing and disallowing access (i.e., 
exercising collective action rights as described in [31]); 
● Spectrum users must have a way of determining others' 
usage for enforcement purposes. 
The success of WiFi in the ISM bands shows that databases 
are not necessary for effective primary non-cooperative 
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sharing, at least in some usage contexts. However, they might 
improve the efficiency of spectrum utilization in such 
environments or facilitate business models such as mesh 
networks that have been widely explored by researchers but 
slow to develop commercially. As mentioned in subsection A, 
a blockchain could be used to create a timestamped and 
geocoded spectrum use data record. The process to create such 
records could be similar to that shown in Figure 4. Each 
spectrum user will only need to know about its local 
environment at any given moment to determine the availability 
of spectrum resources. Based on this information, devices or 
network controllers could develop a near real-time map of the 
local spectrum environment depending on the latency of the 
blockchain to attain consensus on the validity of recorded 
spectrum use entries. Such information could be used to decide 
whether to admit new users to a private commons.   
In essence, blockchain would be used to keep a dynamic 
record of the users operating in the band. However, as 
mentioned in subsection A, having each device register its 
location on the blockchain would generate significant overhead. 
The practical question is whether the benefits in terms of 
spectrum re-use and improved device performance would 
exceed the costs. 
 
 
Figure 4- Example of registration of spectrum use in a primary non-
cooperative environment using Blockchain. 
Open access commons might lend themselves more to public 
blockchain networks, because they are open to anyone. 
Spectrum users in an open access environment are untrusted. 
Users cannot assume that other users (or more precisely, MAC 
layers of their devices) will be polite. On the other hand, 
blockchains for this category of spectrum sharing are likely to 
handle a relatively high volume of transactions. If the 
blockchain is dynamically recording all users of a band as they 
operate and move, it will need scalable real-time processing 
capacity. This tends to be more difficult on public blockchains, 
because they use complex consensus mechanisms in place of 
trusted identity of participants and reaching a reliable consensus 
takes time which introduces a delay on obtaining an actionable 
view of the actual spectrum occupancy.   
Furthermore, in an open access commons, no particular 
protocol is required of devices, so participation in a blockchain-
assisted system would not be guaranteed. Users or devices 
would need sufficient incentives to contribute to, and check 
with prior to transmission, a blockchain distributed ledger. A 
related question is who would be willing to operate the nodes 
of such a network and bear the cost of their operation. One 
answer might be to use a cryptocurrency. Device operators 
could pay to participate in a blockchain-mediated real-time 
tracking system that would improve performance, and node 
operators would be compensated for maintain and verifying 
transactions on the ledger. 
Table 8- Benefits and drawbacks of blockchains in primary non-
cooperative sharing 
Although, a blockchain in an open access commons scenario 
could aid regulators in assessing spectrum use activity, and in 
pursuing enforcement against users who violate the 
transmission standards for the band, the costs of its operation 
and generation of incentives for devices to participate in it 
makes very unlikely that they could be used in those scenarios. 
Additionally, it is unclear whether sufficient information would 
be stored in the blockchain to support an enforcement action. 
In the case of a private commons, a permissioned blockchain 
could be a good fit, because all users must be identified in order 
to access the spectrum.  There might be efficiencies of having 
the operator of the commons also manage the blockchain, 
although a third party could handle it too. The operator could 
Primary Non-cooperative Sharing 
Open Access Commons Private Commons 
Benefits (+) and drawbacks (-) 
(+) Enhanced spectrum 
use efficiency 
(+) Blockchain can be 
used to confirm presence of 
a node and verify its identity 
(+) Map of local spectrum 
use can be built subject to the 
speed of the consensus 
algorithm used. 
(-) Cost and overhead to 
run the blockchain may be 
prohibitive 
(-) No reward incentive 
for nodes to maintain and 
participate in the blockchain 
(+) Enhanced spectrum 
use efficiency 
(+) Near real-time map of 
local spectrum use can be 
built 
(+) Blockchain facilitates 
the enforcement of spectrum 
access rights 
(-) Commons manager can 
be a single point of failure 
unless its functions are 
distributed among a trusted 
set of managers at the 
expense of overhead. 
Blockchain type to use 
Public blockchain. 
However, likely infeasible 
due to the overhead and the 
network structure needed to 
operate it and its associated 
cost. 
Permissioned blockchain 
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use the blockchain to manage individual devices efficiently, or 
to develop longer-term analytics about the spectral 
environment. However, the commons manager can become a 
single point of failure unless its functions are distributed among 
a trusted set of additional manager entities, causing overhead. 
In a private commons, compliance with coordination 
standards is required by the commons manager. Therefore, 
enforcement is not just a matter of baseline requirements set by 
regulators, but of the specific terms set for the private 
commons. Because every device would have to register and be 
identified, smart contracts could be used to establish payment 
mechanisms from devices to the commons manager. They 
could also operate as a “kill switch” for devices that fail to meet 
applicable requirements.  
The Table 8 summarizes the benefits, drawbacks and 
characteristics of using a blockchain that keeps a record of the 
wireless users operating in a primary non-cooperative sharing 
environment. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR STAKEHOLDERS 
A blockchain-based spectrum management model could 
have a broad set of implications for different entities in the 
spectrum ecosystem.  Here we briefly consider several of the 
major stakeholder in this space. 
A. Incumbents 
Incumbent holders of spectrum might view blockchain as a 
negative if it ushers in the sharing of their current exclusively 
held spectrum. Such sharing might increase concerns over 
interference issues, but more significantly, it might result in a 
decreased value to exclusively held spectrum.  On the other 
hand, there might be blockchain models that incumbents use as 
a coordination tool for their users, or to coordinate leasing of a 
given band. If sharing is mandated, these distributed ledgers 
could support enforceable appropriate use. We believe that, in 
general, incumbents will be more concerned about the potential 
increase in sharing, loss of control, and negative impact on 
spectrum values, than in the opportunities to improve 
management of the spectrum they control.  
B. Entrants 
Spectrum entrants would likely have the most to gain if 
blockchain-based spectrum management were adopted. It could 
allow for easier, more coordinated access to spectrum and 
enable access to shared (possibly free or low cost) spectrum.  
As mentioned above, it is possible that spectrum could be 
accessed in some form of coordinated leasing or new unlicensed 
models, lowering the high bar often associated with obtaining 
adequate spectrum. Cryptocurrencies could support new 
economic arrangement involving micropayments and 
automated smart contracts, which might foster broader and 
better-quality access on an unlicensed foundation. 
C. Spectrum Managers 
The blockchain model duplicates many spectrum 
management functions performed in centralized entities such as 
database operators or band managers.  In blockchain systems, 
many of the functions performed by these entities would be 
implemented in a decentralized manner that does not require a 
significant role for traditional spectrum management entities. 
D. Policy makers 
The implications of blockchain on spectrum management are 
probably biggest on policymakers and spectrum regulators.  
While this approach could enable new access and new business 
models, relieving demand by improving access, it could also 
lessen the current command and control model of spectrum 
management in a way that some regulators would be unwilling 
to consider.  Blockchains might also have a negative impact on 
spectrum revenues if they allow for easier and cheaper access 
to what has been managed as a scarce resource.  
One of the more interesting applications could be blockchain 
as a tool for coordination between governments.  For example, 
blockchain could be employed as a management layer when US 
troops are using spectrum during times of friendly occupancy 
(a major issue for DoD). Lastly, it is worth noting that 
blockchains could be part of a more involved process of 
policing for interference events.  Here, a log would exist 
indicating who was using bands at what time/place and this 
could help in resolving interference events.  Of course, it isn’t 
clear that blockchain would be needed for such monitoring, but 
it would provide some useful attributes for such a process. 
E. International Implications 
At an international level, it is unclear just how blockchain 
based spectrum management would work.  It could be that 
agreements would be put in place to allow blockchain as an 
enabler of cross border access to spectrum.  It could be that 
blockchain be used as a monitoring (accounting) tool in certain 
bands or used as a tool for coordination during times of joint 
use of spectrum.  The biggest concern is that this approach 
might raise sovereignty issues by disintermediating the power 
and role of the national regulator by differing to a distributed 
permissionless approach.  Each nation state could decide 
whether blockchain-connected devices would be allowed to 
operate in its territory. However, because blockchains are 
decentralized (especially public blockchains), it might not be 
easy for a government to prohibit operation of the blockchain 
itself to record information for spectrum-sharing applications. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper broadly examines the application of blockchain to 
spectrum sharing. We demonstrate that a number of areas 
would benefit from further research. It is too early to declare 
with confidence that blockchain will be superior to 
conventional database technology, or even that useful 
blockchain-mediated spectrum sharing is technically feasible. 
However, the primary benefits of blockchain-based distributed 
ledgers—decentralization, transparency, immutability, 
availability, and security—are all well-suited to some modes of 
spectrum sharing. By drilling down into each principal mode, 
we have identified several scenarios for potentially productive 
implementation of blockchain technology.  
As situations suitable for blockchain-based approaches in 
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spectrum sharing are identified, some additional questions arise 
that require further research. From a technical perspective, the 
question is whether blockchain performs “better” than alternate 
implementations. In this analysis, it would be critical to identify 
the correct objective function; it would be one thing to compare 
two systems based on technical requirements and quite another 
if socio-technical goals were to be considered.  
There are also several general challenges for blockchain 
technology that remain to be resolved. Major public 
blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum use a consensus 
mechanism, proof of work, that requires massive energy 
expenditures by the miners who compete to verify transactions. 
Alternatives such as proof of stake do not yet have a track 
record of operating securely at scale. Scalability, governance, 
and interoperability are major challenges for all blockchain 
systems, especially public blockchains. A number of solutions 
are still in development, such as new consensus algorithms and 
“layer 2” solutions that rely on the blockchain for security but 
are not limited by their performance characteristics. 
Cryptocurrencies tend to be extremely volatile, and have seen 
both scams and theft. While these may not directly affect 
blockchain systems designed for applications such as spectrum 
sharing, a major cryptocurrency crash could have negative 
fallout on development activity and adoption.  
Permissioned blockchains, on the other hand, need to 
demonstrate that they offer significant differentiation from 
traditional approaches. As has been pointed out elsewhere [46], 
while blockchain systems can be transformational, they are not 
the solution to every problem.  If a database-driven system such 
as an advanced SAS is not being deployed today, for whatever 
reasons, it is not obvious that a permissioned blockchain would 
cause a different result. Furthermore, there are many different 
consensus mechanisms and network configurations under the 
permissioned blockchain heading, just as for public 
blockchains. A fragmented situation in which different groups 
push for their preferred solution could eliminate potential 
benefits of a universal shared ledger. Finally, deployment and 
operation of blockchain networks and the associated 
decentralized applications and smart contracts is not costless. 
There would need to be economic models, whether through 
internal cryptocurrencies or external funding, to support 
deployment of the systems described in this paper. 
We find that the application of blockchains to spectrum 
sharing systems will result in significant architectural and 
operational changes.  This was also the conclusion in [48], 
where the authors examined how blockchain technology might 
be applied to the Internet of Things (IoT).  In [36], we see that 
this conclusion seems to apply to nearly every blockchain-
based system.  
We also note that blockchain is an ideology as much as it is 
a technical approach. Further work is needed to assess how 
consistent this ideology is with spectrum sharing, or rather, 
when it is. From an initial observation, the emphasis on 
decentralized coordination that animates blockchain 
communities seems like a strong fit for some models of 
spectrum sharing. Given the high level of development activity 
and interest in blockchain technology today, and the continued 
need for enhanced spectrum access and utilization methods, 
blockchain approaches to spectrum sharing deserve further 
investigation. 
APPENDIX: BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY 
Blockchain takes advantage of cryptographic methods to 
guarantee both trust and reliability of data. All data entries to 
the blockchain are digitally signed. As the name suggests, data 
is stored in chains of blocks, each of which incorporates a 
cryptographic hash function linking it to the prior block. Each  
new block of transactions is appended to the end of the chain. 
The nodes that participate on the distributed ledger network 
broadcast transactions to each other and validate each new 
block as it is added. 
Strictly speaking, not all distributed ledger platforms use the 
blockchain data structure. R3’s Corda platform, for example, 
combines a blockchain-type consensus mechanism with a 
traditional relational database for information storage. 
Following the standard usage, we employ the term 
“blockchain” for immutable distributed ledgers that use a 
consensus algorithm so that no entity has control over 
transaction validation.  
As a classic example of a permissionless distributed ledger, 
Bitcoin uses randomized selection to achieve consensus, 
backed by an approach called proof of work [1] [23].  Proof of 
work is designed to make attacks costly for the attackers to 
subvert the voting-based consensus process.  In proof of work, 
“miners” authenticate blocks by competing repeatedly amongst 
each other to solve a computationally difficult mathematical 
puzzle that is related to the information contained in the block. 
The greater the miner's processing power, the greater the chance 
of finding the solution and winning. If a miner solves the 
mathematical puzzle, the miner broadcasts the block of the 
digital actions to all the nodes of the network to be approved. 
All the other nodes in the network check the block and if a 
majority of nodes agree, that block of digital-actions is added 
to the blockchain. The "winning" miner for each block receives 
Bitcoin as a reward. Proof of work makes attacks costly, 
because a dishonest node is competing against the total 
processing power of the network [36]. Because each block is 
linked to the previous ones, it becomes more and more difficult 
to falsify a block as time goes on.  
Not all blockchains use proof of work. It requires immense 
computing power and its associated electricity. Although 
Bitcoin's proof of work system has worked successfully since 
2009 as the currency went from zero to an aggregate value of 
over $120 billion at mid-2018 exchange rates, concerns about 
potential vulnerabilities and misbehavior by miners remain. 
Proof of stake, which avoids the need for mining and its colossal 
waste of energy, is being actively explored as the future 
consensus mechanism for Ethereum, the second most valuable 
public blockchain [20] [36]. Table 9 describes the 
characteristics of a few consensus protocols.  
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Permissioned blockchains can use more lightweight 
consensus protocols. In these networks, only authenticated 
parties can process transactions. The network may be open to 
anyone meeting specified criteria, or it may be limited to a 
private consortium. Either way, because nodes are known, they 
can more easily be trusted. A variety of blockchains such as 
XRP, Stellar, Hyperledger Fabric, Symbiont, and R3 Corda use 
consensus mechanisms based around voting processes among 
nodes [20] [21]. This can typically be done far more quickly 
than proof of work or proof of stake, making it easier to scale 
permissioned blockchain networks for high transaction volume 
applications. On the other hand, permissioned blockchains do 
not offer the same level of decentralization as public systems.  
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